The inability of political bodies to make difficult decisions is already significant. This inability is naturally due to a lower convergence among members in trade policy than in the past and during the Uruguay cycle. However, these substantive differences could be less visible and less damaging if the decision-making process were more effective. All presumptions in Article XXIV, paragraph 7, point a), are considered by a working group in light of the relevant provisions of the 1994 GATT and paragraph 1 of this agreement. The working group presents a report to the Trade in Goods Council on its findings in this regard. The Eastern State Council may submit these recommendations to members, as long as it deems it appropriate. 3. Changes to the provisions of this agreement or multilateral trade agreements in Schedules 1A and 1C, which are not listed in paragraphs 2 and 6 and which would change the rights and obligations of members, come into force for members who have adopted them after two-thirds of members have adopted them and, subsequently, for any other member after their adoption. The Ministerial Conference may decide, with three-quarters of the members, that any amendment that has come into force under this paragraph is such that any member who has not accepted it within a time frame set by the Ministerial Conference is free to withdraw from the WTO or to remain a member with the agreement of the Ministerial Conference.

The implementation of the concessions and commitments contained in the timetables attached to this protocol is subject, at the request of the members, to multilateral review. This would not affect the rights and obligations of members arising from the agreements listed in Schedule 1A of the WTO agreement. For reasons of place and brevity, this document will not detail the decision-making process of multilateral or (almost) universal organizations other than the WTO. At present, it should simply be stressed that the vote in the General Assembly and the Security Council is an integrated mechanism within the United Nations. Every state has one vote. However, in recent decades, the General Assembly has seen a tendency towards consensus rather than formal votes. Voting is a common practice in the Security Council, the body that adopts binding decisions for all members of the United Nations, including decisions on war and peace. In addition, only a fraction of the members of the United Nations, 15 states, are represented on the Security Council.

But that may be precisely why voting does not seem to be a problem. With its 15 members, the Security Council is automatically a representative body acting on behalf of all its members. This may make it more acceptable for decisions to be taken by a majority, since the Authority is representative anyway. It may also not be necessary to effectively put important substantive issues to a vote in order to achieve improvement. Normally, it is felt that the mere fact that one can vote should limit the risk of a consensus leading to WTO paralysis. [74] However, this can only work if the possibility of a vote is a shadow under which the search for consensus takes place. This „shadow of a vote“ must be visible and should not be missed as it is present, which leaves behind only the shadow of isolation if a single member prevents a consensus, and the „shadow of the crisis“ for the WTO as a whole.